for useful comments and supplying us with reference materials, two anonymous referees for a series of very helpful comments, Yisgedu Amde and Sanjukta Mukherjee for helpful research assistance and Manorama Rani for document processing. We also thank seminar participants at IFPRI, the World Bank and at the conference on "Chronic poverty and development policy" held at the University of Manchester in April 2003 for their very useful remarks. The paper was commissioned by the Social Protection Anchor unit for the Safety Nets Primer series. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, its affiliated organizations, or to the members of the Board of Directors or the countries they represent. 
Introduction
Over the last two decades there has been an emerging consensus that social safety nets designed to raise and protect the consumption levels of poor households have a crucial role to play in the development process (World Bank, 1990 Bank, , 1997 Bank, , 2000 . Implementation of this agenda for reducing poverty requires methods for reaching the poor. This can be accomplished by 'broad targeting' in the form of spending on items that reach a wide swath of society including the poor (for example, universal primary education, an extensive network of basic health care) or by 'narrow targeting' where methods that identify the poor more specifically are used to confer benefits disproportionately to this group (for example, transfer programs). 1 The case for the latter form of targeting arises from the existence of a budget constraint. 2 The overall poverty impact of a program depends both on the number of poor households covered and the level of benefits they receive. With a fixed poverty alleviation budget, the opportunity cost of transfers "leaking" to non-poor households is a lower impact in terms of poverty reduction, reflecting less coverage of poor households and/or lower benefit levels. By targeting transfers to poor households, one can increase the amount transferred to them.
In addition to the debate surrounding the appropriate balance between broadly and narrowly targeted interventions, there are sharply divergent views as to how much the latter actually benefit the poor. Divergent views on the efficacy of this approach are based on differing assessments of three questions: i) Whether better targeting outcomes are likely to be achieved; ii) Whether such methods are cost effective; and iii) Whether the living standards of the poor are improved by such targeted interventions. This paper 1 van de Walle (1998) contains a useful discussion of these approaches. 2 General discussions of the principles underlying narrow targeting are found in Atkinson (1995) , Besley and Kanbur (1993) , Grosh (1994) , van de Walle (1998) and Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2003a) .
addresses the first question. 3 While it would seem that there exists a fairly extensive literature on this topic, it is largely dominated by descriptions of individual, sometime idiosyncratic, programs. Even comparative analyses tend to cover either a single region (Grosh, 1994 , for Latin America and the Caribbean; Braithwaite, Grootaert and Milanovic, 2000 for Eastern Europe and Central Asia), or method (Bigman and Fofack, 2000 , on geographic targeting), or intervention (Rawlings, Sherburne-Benz and van Domelen, 2001 , on social funds). This partial coverage frustrates efforts to make broader assessments about the effectiveness of different targeting methods or to draw policyrelevant lessons.
We rectify this weakness by drawing on a newly constructed database of 122 targeted anti-poverty interventions drawn from 48 countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean, Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, the Middle East and North
Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South and East Asia. We use these data to address three questions: 1) What targeting outcomes are observed? 2) Are there systematic differences in targeting performance by targeting methods and other factors? 3) What are the implications for such systematic differences for the design and implementation of targeted interventions?
We find that the median targeted program is progressive in that it transfers 25 percent more to poor individuals -persons and households found in the bottom quintiles - 3 We stress that this focus does not arise because we consider the second and third questions to be unimportant. Rather, our focus in whether targeted interventions reach the poor is conditioned by three factors. First, if targeting is largely ineffective, the answers to these remaining questions are moot. Second, there are simply not enough studies with cost data. As we discuss in the paper, fewer than 20 per cent of the interventions in our database report information on both targeting performance and the cost of targeting. Moreover, the cost data suffer severely from lack of comparability. Third, assessment of impact requires careful attention to the counterfactual, what beneficiaries would have done in the absence of these interventions. Few studies do so with any care, exceptions being Datt and Ravallion (1994) , Ravallion and Datt (1995) , Jalan and Ravallion (1999) and Skoufias (2001) .
than would be the case with a universal allocation. However, for a staggering quarter of the programs, outcomes are regressive. Countries with higher income, which we take to imply better capacity for program implementation, do better at directing benefits towards poorer members of the population, as do countries where governments are more likely to be held accountable for their beha vior, as suggested by better measures of voice.
Targeting is also better in countries where inequality is more pronounced. This is consistent with their being higher welfare gains from targeting when inequality is high as well as lower costs in identifying poor beneficiaries.
Subject to a number of caveats, interventions that use means testing, geographic targeting, and self-selection based on a work requirement are all associated with an increased share of benefits going to the bottom two quintiles. Proxy means testing, community-based selection of individuals and demographic targeting to children show good results on average, but with wide variation. Self-selection based on consumption, demographic targeting to the elderly, and community bidding show limited potential for good targeting. That said, we emphasize that there is considerable variation in targeting performance when we examine experiences with specific program types and specific targeting methods. This partly reflects heterogeneity across the interventions we assesssome, like means tested transfers have poverty reduction as their sole objective while others, such as social funds, have multiple objectives. However, the existence of substantial variation in targeting performance within specific program types and specific targeting methods suggests that differences in implementation are also important determinants of successful targeting to poor individuals.
Data Construction and Description

Database Construction
As noted above, while there is a fairly rich literature on targeted programs, much of it either documents single programs or compares outcomes within a single region, method or class of intervention. Accordingly, the first step in our analysis was an extensive literature review and the construction of a database of targeted anti-poverty interventions. 4 To our knowledge, this work represents the most extensive attempt to construct such a database.
Our criteria for inclusion in this database were the following: i) The intervention had to be situated in a low or middle-income country; ii) A principal objective of the intervention is poverty reduction defined in terms of income or consumption; iii) The intervention involves a transfer of resources to the beneficiary; iv) Documentation on the intervention contains information on the targeting method used, its implementation and something about outcomes; and v) The intervention is relatively recent (generally from 1985-2002) . Included in our data are cash transfers (including welfare and social assistance payments, child benefits and non-contributory pensions), near-cash transfers (such as quantity rationed subsidized food rations and food stamps), food transfers, universal food subsidies, non-food subsidies, public works, and social funds.
Two observations should be made on these criteria for inclusion. First, a number of interventions that are included have objectives that include, but are not limited to, 4 This is available in the form of an annotated bibliography, Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2003b) . For each program we obtained details on the study itself (title, authors, reference details, year of publication, study objective), background information on the intervention (program name, year implemented, program description, type of benefit, program coverage and budget, transfer levels), targeting method (what criteria were used to determine eligibility, targeting mechanism), how the intervention operated, targeting performance (who benefited), and descriptions of impact on welfare and costs of targeting. direct poverty reduction. Social funds are a good example. While short term poverty reduction can be an important component of these interventions, so too can be the construction of physical assets valued by the poor and the development of local capacity to design, implement and maintain infrastructure. The heterogeneity of objectives within broadly defined "anti-poverty" interventions means that one must be cautious in interpreting comparisons across types of interventions.
Second, focusing the review in this way necessarily means excluding a number of interventions that may, in some cases, be targeted, and may have some impact in terms of poverty reduction. Thus, excluded are: 'occupationally based transfer schemes' such as formal sector unemployment insurance or occupational old age or disability pensions (here, the principal mechanism that determines eligibility and benefit levels are employment and contributions history rather than current poverty status); credit and micro-credit schemes (although these are often targeted, they are motivated, in large part, by credit market failures and do not necessarily involve a transfer of resources to participants) 5 ; supplementary feeding programs (mainly because our foray into the vast literature on this type of intervention did not yield studies that satisfied the criteria described above); and most short-term emergency aid (because although this has a clear poverty focus, and is often targeted by need, the time scale on which it operates typically precludes an assessment of the distribution of the benefits). Grosh (1994) and Braithwaite, Grootaert and Milanovic (2000) .
Given the nature of such a search, it is important to remember that our sample of interventions is not necessarily reflective of the distribution of programs that exist in the 
Database Description
Based on the criteria described above, we were able to collect information for 122 interventions drawn from 48 countries. Table 1 
Self-selection:
With some interventions, although eligibility is universal the design intentionally involves dimensions that are thought to encourage the poorest to use the program and the non-poor not to do so. 6 This is accomplished by recognizing differences in the private participation costs between poor and non-poor households. For example, this may involve: (a) the use of low wages on public works schemes so that only those with a low opportunity cost of time due to low wages or limited hours of employment will present themselves for jobs; (b) the restriction of transfers to take place at certain times with a requirement to queue; or (c) the location of points of service delivery in areas where the poor are highly concentrated so that the non-poor have higher (private and social) costs of access. An alternative form of self-selection is found in social fund-type interventions where communities apply for program funds. Here, selection uses differences in the private participation costs between poor and non-poor communities as a way of targeting benefits.
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Note that universal food subsid ies (with or without quantity rationing) can be viewed as a form of self-selection since they are universally available and households 6 Note because there are always some actions (and therefore costs) required of beneficiaries in order to register for and collect a benefit, strictly speaking all programs are self-targeted to some degree. 7 Social funds also use other mechanisms such as geographical targeting. Differences in access to information or capacity for 'demanding' social funds also accounts for differential access to these interventions.
receive benefits by deciding to consume the commodity. In practice households can often determine not just whether or no t to participate, but also the intensity of their participation. The more income elastic are expenditures on these items the more effective is the targeting. For example, food transfers often involve commodities with "inferior"
characteristics (e.g. low quality wheat or rice) and households often substitute away from such expenditures as incomes increase.
8 Table 2 uses this broad taxonomy of targeting methods but also specifies the principal approaches taken within the three broad categories of individual assessment, There are also broad differences across income levels. Generally, poorer countries tend to rely more on self-selection methods and categorical targeting whereas forms of individual assessment are relatively more common in less poor countries. The one exception to these general patterns is categorical targeting by age, which is used relatively less frequently in poor countries.
Although certain program types are synonymous with certain targeting methods, most use a combination of methods, presumably because there is synergy from the perspective of targeting efficiency. Public works programs typically use a combination of geographic targeting and self-selection based on low wages and a work requirement.
But, in practice, public works also often require additional rationing of employment using categorical targeting if demand exceeds supply at the wage paid. Similarly social funds are partly demand driven and therefore have an element of community self-selection.
Food subsidies are self-targeted based on consumption patterns. Cash transfers are most likely to have some form of individual assessment, but are also often conditioned on other characteristics (such as age in the case of pensions or child benefit).
Assessing targeting effectiveness
In this section we outline the methodology used in this paper to compare targeting performance across interventions, identifying some important caveats that must be kept in mind when interpreting this indicator. We also provide a brief description of targeting outcomes in terms of this indicator of targeting performance.
Measuring targeting effectiveness
There is a growing literature on measuring targeting effectiveness, see Ravallion and Chao (1989) , Ravallion (1993) , Cornia and Stewart (1995) and Coady and Skoufias (2001) . Here, in order to compare the performance of the different targeting methods used in the range of programs considered in our analysis, we need a comparable performance indicator for each program. As is always the case is such "meta" analyses, the definitions, methods and presentations in the original studies vary in ways that make it difficult to assemble such a single summary performance indicator. Incidence and participation rates may be reported over the full welfare distribution; for the poorest 10, 20 or 40 percent of the population; or for a poor/non-poor classification that differs by country. Other studies report none of these measures, but use other less common ones.
And, of course, the measure of welfare used is not always strictly comparable from study to study. Thus we are faced with how best to compare targeting performance outcomes using data that are not strictly comparable.
Most studies catalogued in our database provide information on at least one of the following indices:
?? The proportion of total transfers received by individuals or households falling within the bottom 40, 20 or 10 percent of the national income distribution.
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?? The proportion of beneficiaries falling within the bottom 40, 20, or 10 percent of the national income distribution.
?? The proportion of total transfers or beneficiaries going to "poor" households or individuals, where the poor are defined in terms of some specified part of the welfare distribution (e.g. falling in the bottom 35 percent of the income distribution).
Ideally we would like to know the proportion of total transfers received by households falling within different centiles (40th, 20 th , 10 th and so on) of the national income distribution. This is a better measure than the proportion of beneficiaries by centile because in the case of the latter, we do not necessarily know anything about variations in the levels of transfers. These two measures -proportions of total transfers and proportions of beneficiaries -are only equivalent when transfer levels are uniform across beneficiaries.
Given that no single common measure of targeting performance is available, we have constructed a measure based on a comparison of actual performance to a common reference outcome, namely, the outcome that would result from neutral (as opposed to progressive or regressive) targeting. A neutral targeting outcome means that each decile receives 10 percent of the transfer budget or that each decile accounts for 10 percent of the program beneficiaries. One can think of neutral targeting as arising either from the 9 The precise manner in which these transfers are calculated varies by study. In general, they are based on nationally representative household survey data that estimates the share of transfers that accrue to individuals in the bottom deciles of the consumption distribution. As noted in footnote 2, such estimates do not take into account changes in private transfer behavior or labor supply. Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2003b) provide a description of these calculations by intervention as well as references to the original source material. The performance indicator used in the analysis below is based on a lexicographic selection process among the available incidence indicators based on the different "target groups". Where it is available, we base performance on the proportion of benefits accruing to the bottom two quintiles. Where this is not available, we base it on the proportion of benefits accruing to the bottom quintile, then benefits to the bottom decile and lastly, the share of program benefits received by individuals deemed to be below a poverty line. We can calculate such a performance indicator for 85 programs. Table 3 lists all programs for which we can construct our performance indicator from best to worst. There is enormous variation in targeting performance, ranging from 4, for the Trabajar public works program in Argentina to 0.28, for VAT exemptions on fresh milk in South Africa. The median value is 1.25, so that the "typical" program transfers 25 percent more to households found in the bottom quintiles or below the poverty line than would be the case with a universal allocation. However, a staggering 21 of the 85 programs -25 per cent -are regressive, with a performance index less than one. In these cases, a random selection of beneficiaries would actually provide greater benefits to the poor.
Descriptive Results
It is instructive to focus on the worst and best ten programs. The worst ten have a median score of only 0.60, ranging from 0.28-0.78. Five out of the ten are food subsidy programs while three involve cash transfers. In fact, median performance rises to 1.3 if interventions using self-selection based on consumption are withdrawn from the sample.
Doing so also reduces the proportion of regressive interventions to 16 per cent. It is also noticeable that only one of the poorly performing programs uses either means or proxymeans targeting methods, none of them are geographically targeted, and they come from across the income spectrum. The top ten programs have a median score of 2.15, range from 2.02-4.00, and all but one are from either LAC or ECA. Nine out of the ten involve cash transfers. Nine out of the ten make use of means, proxy-means, or geographic targeting, and seven out of the ten are in less-poor countries.
The fact that cash-transfers feature in both the best and worst ten programs highlights the possibility that variations in targeting performance may reflect poor implementation rather than poor potential for such program per se. It is, however, noticeable that whereas public works are all in the top half of the performance table,
social funds are nearly all in the bottom half. This is consistent with there being a tradeoff between the objective of reducing current poverty (through public-works wage transfers) and the objective of reducing future poverty through developmental public investments (through the assets created by social fund programs). Also, the dominance of less poor countries among the top half of the table suggests that characteristics correlated with income such as administrative capacity are important determinants of targeting performance. This point is further illustrated by noting that raising the performance of all programs with the same targeting method and with performance below the method median to the median for that method, increases mean targeting performance from 1.38 to 1.55, a return of 17 percentage points. In section 4, we return to this issue but first it is necessary to note several caveats to be borne in mind when interpreting these findings.
Caveats and limitations
There are a number of caveats and limitations that should be made explicit with regard to interpreting our performance measure and, thus, the analysis based on it.
First, our performance measure is a mish-mash of va rious measures as discussed above, although for the vast majority of the interventions (80 percent) we use the percentage of benefits accruing to either the bottom 40 percent or 20 percent of the national income distribution. This raises concerns regarding comparability. For example, one may believe that it is more difficult to target the poorest 20 percent compared to the poorest 40% so that programs for which we use the former may appear ineffective solely because of the performance indicator used. We have addressed this issue in a number of ways. We calculated a second performance measure that gives, through its lexicographic ordering, priority to the proportion of resources flowing to the bottom decile, then bottom quintile, then bottom two quintiles. Doing so does not change in any meaningful way the results reported in Tables 3 and 4 . We also ran all regressions (reported below) using both measures of targeting performance and again found no meaningful change to our results. This is not completely surprising given that our performance measure and the alternative have correlation coefficients (in terms of levels and ranks respectively) between 0.94 and 0.97. As a further check, in the multivariate regression analysis we always include variables that control for the performance measure used.
Second, by focusing on the percentage of benefits accruing to the bottom parts of the income distribution we are obviously ignoring where in the remaining parts of the distribution the leaked benefits are going. For example, finding that a program is very ineffectively targeted at the bottom 20 percent is less worrying if the leaked benefits accrue mostly to those just above this income cut-off. This is partly why we give priority to the 40 percent measure of performance when constructing our performance index. It is also arguably the case that such a focus coincides more closely to the objectives of most targeted programs. In any case, the fact that our results are extremely insensitive to the ordering is at least suggestive that where between 20 percent and 40 percent one draws the cut-off point is somewhat inconsequential.
Third, recall that the data we have collated are only a sample of the hundreds of anti-poverty interventions that exist. Further, we could only calculate our performance indicator for two-thirds of this sample. These observations when taken together point to the possibility of "sample selection bias", that is to say that there may be certain characteristics of these programs -for example, the fact that they were evaluated and documented -which are themselves associated with our measures of targeting performance. A good example of this possibility relates to community targeting. Our sample is only a fraction of the studies listed in Conning and Kevane (2001) ; it could well be that only successful interventions using community targeting have been well documented.
Fourth, some of the mis-targeting observed here arises because households that were poor when the program admission decision was made were better off at the time of assessment or vice versa. This has implications for the design of targeted interventions.
Methods that rely on static indicators of living standards (such as proxy means tests) are likely to perform less well than those that rely on self-selection when there is considerable movement of households in and out of poverty and there is no mechanism for updating eligibility.
We remind the reader that we have been able to focus on only one narrow piece of the targeting and program choice decisions. Our performance index focuses solely on the benefit side of the equation and ignores cost, and the latter may be an extremely important factor in choosing targeting methods or programs to transfer income to the poor. For example, it is often argued that well-designed public works programs can be very effective at concentrating benefits in the hands of the poor. However, the high nontransfer costs associated with such programs (including non-wage costs and. forgone income) substantially reduce the cost-effectiveness of such transfer programs in this regard. Our ignoring of the cost side largely reflects data restrictions. In conducting the literature review we collated the available evidence on administrative costs, hoping to comment on how these varied by method. Unfortunately, such data were scant. We have some sort of cost data for 32 programs, but both cost and our performance indicator for only 20. Moreover, the cost data suffer from a severe lack of comparability. Most of the data for Latin America are taken from Grosh (1994) and give administrative costs as a share of the program budget. These numbers were based on budget or expenditure records for program administration and thus include only official costs. No attempt is made to determine how much of program benefits are siphoned off due to corruption or theft. In contrast much of the cost data on South Asian programs is constructed from knowing a total budget and having data from a survey sample on the value of benefit received by households. Through appropriate grossing up, a figure for the total cost per dollar of benefit received is calculated. In most cases it appears that corruption and theft contribute more to total program expenses than legitimate administrative expenses, though little is said about these latter. In any case, even when cost data are available, focusing on benefit incidence is extremely important in its own right.
It is worth reemphasizing that the objective of effectively targeting transfers, while always important, is often only one of the objectives of interventions. Therefore, to the extent that there are trade-off between these other objective and that of effective targeting, this needs to be taken into account when arriving at an overall evaluation of any program. However, it may be the case that these other objectives impinge as much,
if not more so, on the program design, the targeting process, and the way in which the program is "sold" and delivered. Presumably most policy analysts would at least accept that monitoring the targeting performance of programs dedicated mainly to poverty alleviation is always desirable, especially in the context of developing countries where poverty is high, budgets are tight, and other policy instruments (e.g. an comprehensive income tax system) are less developed, less sophisticated and less progressive.
Regression analysis
Although factors other than choice of method or program may be relatively large, this does not mean that these choices are unimportant. To get an idea of the importance of these choices, Table 5 presents the results of a series of regressions that identify how performance varies systematically across these choices as well as country characteristics.
In doing so, we note that targeting methods are themselves choices, they are not "exogenous" or "pre-determined". Consequently, it is incorrect to treat these results as causal relations. Rather, they are measures of partial correlation or association.
Our first specification explores how country characteristics such as income, government accountability and inequality, are associated with (log) incidence. Income is measured as log GDP per capita (in PPP dollars) as of 1995. 10 The hypothesis is that as a country becomes wealthier, it acquires the institutional capacity needed to design a welltargeted intervention. Government accountability is based on work by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) . Compiling subjective perceptions regarding the quality of governance in different countries using sources such as polls of experts, commercial risk rating agencies and cross-country surveys, they define voice, perhaps more accurately described as 'voice and accountability', as a composite measure based on aspects of political processes, civil liberties and political rights and thus captures the extent to which citizens participate in the selection of their governments as well as the extent to which citizens and media can hold governments accountable for their actions. We use countries' percentile ranks (their ranking relative to each other) as these provide an easier way of interpreting the estimated coefficients. In our sample, Viet Nam has the lowest percentile rank for "voice", 6, while Costa Rica has the highest percentile rank, 88. 11 Lastly, we include country-specific Gini coefficients on the grounds that it might be easier to identify potential beneficiaries when income or consumption differences across individuals are greater. We also include, but do not report, controls indicating whether the performance measure is based on the proportion of benefits going to the bottom quintile, the poorest decile, the "poor" defined with reference to a poverty line or the proportion of poor found in population. Doing so takes into account confounding effects arising from the use of different measures of incidence in the studies on which this analysis is based. 10 The income and inequality data are taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database. 11 In preliminary work, we also included a measure of government effectiveness also drawn fro m Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) . However, it is never statistically significant, quite possibly because it is highly correlated with log per capita income.
Standard errors are computed using the methods proposed by Huber (1967) and White (1980) .
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The results shown in specification (1) show that as country income rises and as inequality rises, so does the targeting performance of anti-poverty interventions.
Targeting is also better in countries where government accountability is better.
Specification (2) looks solely at the impact of choice of targeting method. We include dummy variables for nine targeting methods described above: three forms of individual assessment (means testing, proxy means testing, community selection of individual beneficiaries), four forms of categorical targeting (geographic, the elderly, the young, and others), and two types of selection (work requirement, community bidding for projects). The omitted category is self-selection based on consumption. We chose this as the base category for two reasons. It is often argued that this form of targeting should be seen as a transition tool while the capacity for more precise mechanisms -such as means testing -is developed. 13 Conversely, others have expressed skepticism over the ability of alternative targeting methods to reach the poor when compared to self-selection based on the consumption of food. 14 Hence, an attractive feature of this specification is that one 12 Following the suggestion of an anonymous referee, we also explored whether the study had been published in a refereed journal, a book, or was unpublished work undertaken by World Bank staff, IFPRI staff or by individuals based in other institutions. These controls can be thought of in two ways. Arguably, work published in journals (and possibly books) has been more rigorously reviewed so that those studies will be less dogged by measurement error. On the other hand, there may be publishing biases in that only studies with "significant results" are submitted and accepted by journals. The 85 estimates of targeting performance used here come from the following sources: refereed journals, 17; books, 17; unpublished work by World Bank staff, 37; unpublished work by IFPRI staff, 8; and unpublished work by researchers based at other institutions, 6. When we include dummy variables for type of publication as additional controls, we do not find that these are jointly statistically significant and hence do not report them here. But we do note that coefficients on dummy variables for unpublished studies by World Bank staff or by individuals based in other institutions tend to be negative, consistent with the publishing bias hypothesis. 13 See, for example, Pinstrup-Andersen (1988) and Alderman and Lindert (1998) . 14 Such implicit concern is found, for examp le, in Cornia and Stewart (1995) .
should interpret the coefficients on these methods relative to self-selection based on consumption.
Specification (2) shows that means testing, geographic targeting, and selfselection based on a work requirement are all associated with an increased share of program resources going to the poorest quintiles relative to self-selection based on consumption. Proxy means testing, and targeting the young are also associated with improved incidence, though these are measured with larger standard errors. Targeting the elderly, community assessment, other types of categorical targeting and selection based on community bidding are not associated with better incidence relative to our base category, self-targeting based on consumption.
Countries with better capacity for program implementation may do better at directing benefits towards poorer members of the population either by choosing finer targeting methods or implementing their choices more effectively. As such, the associations in specification (2) may be misleading; they may merely reflect correlation between unobserved implementation capacity and observed targeting methods. We explore this possibility in specifications (3) and (4). Controlling for country income level (specification 3), or income, voice and inequality (specification 4) does not appear to eliminate the positive association -relative to self-selection based on consumptionbetween means testing, geographic targeting, and self-selection based on a work requirement and targeting performance. Targeting performance is better in countries with higher levels of income and where governments are held accountable for their actions.
Specifically, a 10 per cent increase in country income is associated with a 1.8% increase in targeting performance. To give a sense of the magnitude of the voice effect, raising the voice rank from 37 (Pakistan's voice rank) to 67 (India's voice rank) would be associated with about a 30 per cent improvement in targeting performance. 15 However, it is possible that geographic targeting will also be more effective in countries with marked inequalities; indeed when we drop geographic targeting from our specification (but not any other method), we obtain a parameter estimate for the log gini coefficient almost identical to that reported in specification (1).
We performed a number of additional specific checks to investigate the robustness of this result. Specification (5) uses the same sample and regressors as specification (4), but the dependent variable is expressed in levels instead of logs. Our basic results remain unchanged: means testing, geographic targeting and targeting based on a work requirement raise targeting performance relative to the omitted category, selfselection based on consumption. There is no meaningful change in any of our other results. Specification (6) takes a slightly different approach, estimating median regressions, which express differences in performance in terms of differences in medians. 16 This is an attractive check on robustness because the median is considerably less sensitive to outliers, an especially important consideration when working with small sample sizes. The results are broadly similar to specification (4) -which uses an identical set of regressors, sample and dependent variable -with the one exception being that the log gini coefficient has a markedly larger coefficient.
17
Our discussion has focused largely on the association between different targeting methods and targeting performance relative to self-selection based on consumption and conditioning on country characteristics. We have not explored the association between combinations of targeting methods and targeting performance despite the fact that use of multiple methods is common. (2), we represent the number of targeting methods by a series of dummy variables. This produces a similar finding.
Unfortunately, our sample size is too small to explore the association between specific groupings of methods and targeting performance but these results are suggestive that such an approach improves targeting.
Conclusion
This paper addresses the contested issue of the efficacy of targeting interventions in developing countries using a newly constructed database of 122 targeted anti-poverty interventions found in 48 countries. We use these data to address three questions: 1)
What targeting outcomes are observed? 2) Are there systematic differences in targeting performance by method and other factors? 3) What are the implications for such systematic differences for the design and implementation of targeted interventions?
quintile; and (3) including only studies that report the share of benefits accruing either to the bottom two quintiles, the poorest quintile or the poorest decile. When we do so, we continue to obtain comparable results to those reported in specification (4) . These results are available on request.
We find that the median value of our measure of targeting performance is 1.25, so that the median program transfers 25 percent more to poor individuals -persons and households found in the bottom quintiles -than would be the case with a universal allocation. In this sense, "targeting works". However, a staggering 21 of the 85 programs for which we can build our performance measure -25 per cent -are regressive, with a performance index less than one. In these cases, a random selection of beneficiaries would actually provide greater benefits to the poor. Some of this regressivity is driven by the inclusion of food subsidy interventions that use self-selection based on consumption as a targeting method. However, even when these are dropped from our sample, we still find that 14 per cent of targeted anti-poverty interventions are regressive.
Countries with better capacity for program implementation, as measured by GDP per capita do better at directing benefits towards poorer members of the population.
Countries where governments are more likely to be held accountable for their behaviour -where "voice" is stronger -also appear to implement interventions with improved targeting performance. Targeting is also better in countries where inequality is more prono unced and presumably differences in economic wellbeing are easier to identify.
Mindful of our caveats, interventions that use means testing, geographic targeting, and self-selection based on a work requirement are all associated with an increased share of benefits going to the bottom two quintiles. Proxy means testing, community-based selection of individuals and demographic targeting to children show good results on average, but with wide variation. Self-selection based on consumption, demographic targeting to the elderly, and community bidding show limited potential for good targeting.
That said, we emphasize that there is considerable variation in targeting performance when we examine experiences with specific program types and specific targeting methods. This partly reflects heterogeneity across the interventions we assess as some have multiple objectives whereas others are solely focused on poverty reduction.
But even when we consider targeting by specific method or program type, there is considerable intra-group variability. Thus it is not surprising that while community assessment generally performs no better relative to self-targeting based on consumption, Alderman's (2002) study of community targeting in Albania describes a highly successful example of this form of targeting. Similarly, Case and Deaton (1998) and Duflo (2000) show that in South Africa, targeting the elderly is an effective method for reaching poor children, even though as we have shown here, targeting the elderly generally performs relatively poorly when compared to other methods for reaching the poor.
Thus, while the patterns observed are instructive, they should not be interpreted as a lexicographic ranking of methods. Differences in individual country characteristics and implementation are also important determinants of outcomes and must be considered carefully in making appropriate targeting decisions. For example, in countries where illiteracy is high, it makes little sense to require potential beneficiaries to fill out forms as part of a means test; such requirements will only serve to discourage otherwise eligible beneficiaries from applying as Munro (2003) illustrates in his Zimbabwean case study.
This suggests that further work on targeting should extend beyond simple quantitative comparison of methods to consider more detailed and often qualitative issues of comparisons within methods -how does and should implementation differ in different settings and how can constraints of political economy, poor information or low administrative capacity best be accommodated or reduced? In a companion paper (Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2003a) , we provide a more detailed discussion of the merits and limitations of individual targeting methods in an attempt to move in this direction. (1) and (2) contain controls, not reported, indicating whether performance measure is based on proportion of benefits going to the (a) bottom quintile, (b) poorest decile, (c) to the "poor" or (d) proportion of poor found in population. 2. Specifications (1) and (2) estimate standard errors using the methods proposed by Huber (1967) and White (1980) . 3. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
